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A set of ordinal assumptions, formulated in terms of a given multidimensional 
stimulus set, is shown to yield essentially unique additive difference measurement 
of dissimilarity, or psychological distance. According to this model, dissimilarity 
judgments between multidimensional objects are regarded as composed of two inde- 
pendent processes: an intradimensional subtractive process, and an interdimensional 
additive process. Although the additive difference measurement model generalizes 
traditional metric models, the conditions under which it satisfies the metric axioms 
impose severe restrictions on the measurement scales. The implications of the results 
for the representation of similarity data by metric and/or dimensional models are 
discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent review, Beals, Krantz, and Tversky (1968) presented and discussed 
axiomatizations of a number of the fundamental geometric models of multidimensional 
scaling, including metrics with additive segments, additive difference metrics, and a 
special case of both, the (Minkowski) power metrics. The exposition relied on a paper 
by Beals and Krantz (1967) and on several unpublished results. The main purpose of 
this paper is to publish proofs of the theorems previously discussed. In particular, 
Theorems 2 and 3 of Beals et al (1968) are included in Theorems 1 and 2 of the 
present paper. The statements about the power metric in the previous paper are 
consequences of a much-improved characterization presented here. We show that the 
i This research was supported by NSF Grants GB 4947 and GB 6782 to the University of 
Michigan. Preparation of the manuscript was assisted by PHS Grant GM 1231 to the Uni- 
versity of Michigan. 
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only additive difference metrics with additive segments are the power metrics (elimi- 
nating a major axiom, A7, used previously to characterize the power metric). 
In addition, we analyze a more general model than any previously considered in 
multidimensional scaling, called decomposability (Eq. 2 below). This model is of 
interest in its own right and serves also to unify our treatment of the different facets of 
the additive difference model, interdimensional additivity and intradimensional 
subtractivity. We also take this opportunity to discuss the concept of “psychological 
dimension” implicit in the present approach. 
The models to be discussed are all generalizations of the power metric (Minkowski 
r-metric, Lp metric), according to which the distance between the points 
s = (Xl ). . . , x,) andy = (yl ,..., yll) is given by 
d(.r,y) = [gl I xi -yyi lr]l”, r 3 1. (1) 
The well-known Euclidean and city-block metrics are special cases of the power 
metric, where r equals 2 or 1, respectively. Equation 1 incorporates three fundamental 
assumptions. 
(a) DECOMPOSABILITY. The distance between points is a function of component- 
wise contributions. 
(b) INTRADIMENSIONAL SUBTRACTIVITY. Each component-wise contribution is the 
absolute value of the scale diSference. 
(c) INTERDIMENSIONAL ADDITIVITY. The distance is a function of the sum of 
component-wise contributions. 
In psychological applications, stimuli x = (x1 ,..., x,) and y  = (yl ,..., yn) may be 
characterized by their components, yet the numerical values of the corresponding 
coordinates in the psychological space are not known in advance. Furthermore, the 
actual distances between such points are also unknown; instead, one has some measure 
of dissimilarity, or “psychological distance,” that is monotonically related to metric 
distance. Regarding the power metric as a model of “psychological distance,” it can be 
generalized in three steps, with two branches. 
The most general equation embodies only decomposability (a): 
4x, Y) = &4(x, > Y&., Mxn 3 YA (2) 
whereF is an increasing function 2 in each of its n arguments, and each & is a symmetric 
2 Throughout the paper, we shall use the terms increasing and decreasing to mean strictly 
monotonically increasing and decreasing functions, respectively. All functions are real-valued. 
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function of two (nominal scale) arguments, xi , yi , with &(xi , xi) < $i(xi , yJ if 
xi # yi . 
I f  subtractivity (b) is assumed we can write Eq. 2 as 
4x, Y) = F(I Xl - Yl I ,..-, I xn - yn I), (3) 
where we have replaced #+(xi , yJ by / Xi - Y, 1 and Xi = fi(xi) is the i-th coordinate 
of stimulus x in the psychological space. Note that Xi is a real number, though xi need 
not be. 
If  additivity (c) alone is assumed, the power metric is generalized to 
where F is now an increasing function in one argument. Note that subtractivity is an 
intradimensional property as it refers to differences along the same dimension while 
additivity is an interdimensional property as it refers to summation across different 
dimensions. Equations 3 and 4 are both special cases of Eq. 2, but represent separate 
branches in generalization. 
If  both additivity and subtractivity are assumed we obtain the additive difference 
model defined by 
d(x, Y> = F [tl $dI x’i - Yi I)] 7 
where F and & , i = I,..., n, are all increasing functions of one variable. Equation 5 is 
a special case of both Eqs. 3 and 4 (for the di would be redundant in Eq. 3, since F is 
already a general function of n variables, increasing in each variable). The power 
metric is, clearly, a special case of the additive difference model, where all c$~ are the 
same convex power function and F is its inverse. 
The purpose of the present paper is the analysis of the models represented by 
Eqs. l-5 from the viewpoint of measurement theory. As in multidimensional psycho- 
physics, we assume that the stimuli can be labeled by a vector of (nominal scale) 
values on n dimensions, and that an ordinal measure of dissimilarity between the 
stimuli is given. The conditions (or axioms) which are necessary and/or sufficient to 
establish decomposability (2), subtractivity (3), additivity (4), or both (5) are presented 
in the next section. The conditions under which the additive difference model (5) 
satisfies the metric axioms, and an axiomatic ordinal characterization of the power 
metric (1) are discussed in Sec. II. The final section explores the implications of the 
results to the analysis of similarity. 
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I. ADDITIVE AND SUBTRACTIVE DIMENSIONS 
The theory is formulated in terms of a product set A = 8, x *.. x A, and a 
real-valued function M defined on .4 x iJ. For example, A may be a set of color 
patches described in terms of their brightness, hue, and saturation, or a set of facial 
expressions described in terms of their intensity and pleasure, or a set of rectangles 
described by their height and width. The function M assigns to every pair of elements 
s, y  in A, a scale value M(x, y), which is an ordinal measure of the dissimilarity, or the 
“psychological distance” between them. We use the letters U, U, w, x, y, z (with or 
without primes) to denote elements of A, with x = (sr ,..., XJ where xi denotes the 
i-th component of X. 
Several comments about the primitives are in order. First, the factorial represen- 
tation of a given set of stimuli need not be unique. Rectangles, for example, may be 
characterized in terms of height and width or in terms of area and shape. The present 
theory, therefore, depends on a particular factorial characterization of the stimuli. 
Second, the components of the stimuli may be nominal scale values and they need 
not be real numbers. Third, in referring to the number of factors of A, denoted n, 
we discard inessential factors that have only a single value. Fourth, the use of an 
ordinal scale M is not essential; it simplifies the axioms, but it can be replaced by an 
abstract order relation on A x A, provided that a separability axiom (Debreu, 1954) 
is introduced. 
In the case of color patches, we expect that the psychological dimensions, brightness, 
hue, and saturation, are more likely to satisfy the axioms than the more arbitrary 
coordinates, luminance, dominant wavelength, and purity. In the case of rectangles, 
the axioms may be better satisfied for height x width than for area x shape represen- 
tations, or vice versa, depending on how the rectangles are perceived; this could vary 
between subjects or be influenced by context. 
To further simplify the statement of the axioms, a notion of betweenness is defined. 
We say that y  is between x’ and Z, denoted x / y  1 Z, if the following two conditions 
hold 
(9 M(.x, 4 2 M(x, y), M(y, z) 
(ii) xi = yi = zi for any i where si = zi . 
Thus, y  is between x and z if it coincides with x and z on any dimensions on which 
they are equal, and if its dissimilarity from each of them does not exceed M(x, z). 
The basic axioms may now be stated as follows. 
(Al) If x f y, then M(x, x) = M(y, y) < M(y, x) = M(x, y). 
(A2) If M(w, x) < 01 < M(w, x), then there exists y such that x / y [ z and 
M(w, y) = ct. 
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(A3) For any i = I,..., n, ; f  xi = Xi’, yj = ya’, zi = zi’, wj = wj’, and for all 
j f  i, xj = Zj , xj’ = z,‘, yj = wj , and yj’ = wj’, then M(x, y) < M(x’,y’) if and 
only if M(x, w) < M(z’, w’). 
(A4) For any i = l,..., n, if xi = zi , xi’ = xi’, yi = wi , yi’ = wi’, and for all 
j # i, Xj = Xi’, yi = yj’, zj = .z,‘, and wj = w,‘, then M(x, y) < M(x’, y’) if and ally 
if M(z, w) < M(z’, w’). 
(A5) For any i = l,..., n, if for all j # i, xj = yj = zj = wj , and x / y  1 z, then 
(i) ify/z~wandy#z,thenxjy/wandx~z~w 
(ii) ifxIzIw,thenxIyIwandy[zIw. 
(A6) For any i = I,..., n, if for all j f  i, xj = yj = Zi = Xj’ = yj’ = ZJ’, 
x [ y  / z, x’ 1 y’ / z‘, and M(y, z) = M(y’, z’), then M(x, y) ,( M (x’, y’) if and only 4 
M(x, z) < M(x’, 2’). 
The axioms are practically identical to those discussed in Beals et al. (1968) and 
we shall not repeat the discussion here, except to remind the reader of a few salient 
mathematical points. The first axiom asserts that M is minimal between a point and 
itself, and symmetric in its two arguments. The second axiom is a solvability condition 
analogous to ones used in other areas of measurement theory (e.g., Lute, 1966). The 
third axiom is the important independence condition, which is the basic axiom of the 
general theory of additive conjoint measurement (see Debreu, 1960). It implies (A4); 
therefore, the latter is assumed only where (A3) is not employed. For the 
two-dimensional case, however, (A3) is replaced by the following cancellation axiom 
(A3’) 
V Mh 3 xz’), (~1, ~2’11 < Mk’, 4% (YI’> ~21 
and Mb,‘, x.2)> (~1’2 ~41 < M&G > xe’), (Y; , y,‘b 
For an empirical test of (A3) in a three-dimensional case, using schematic faces as 
stimuli, see Tversky and Krantz (1969). 
Finally, both (A5) and (A6) are unidimensional properties that apply to elements of A 
that coincide on all but one dimension. The statement of (A6) differs slightly from that 
of Beals et al. (1968), but in the context of (Al), (A2), and (A5), the two are logically 
equivalent. The major results that are based on the above axioms are summarized in the 
following theorem. 
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THEOREM 1. Given a stimulus set satisfying (Al) and (A2) with respect to some 
n-dimensional representation, then the following assertions are valid. 
(a) Decomposability is satisfied if and only if (A4) holds; the & are then ordinal scales. 
(b) Intradimensional subtractivity is satisJied if and only if (A4), (A5), and (A6) 
hold. Thus, under these assumptions there exist one-to-one functions fi , defined on Ai , 
i = I ,..., n, and an increasingfunction F such that M(x, y) = F( 1 X1 - Y1 I,..., 1 X, - Y,, !), 
Xi = fj(xi) for all i, where each fi is an interval scale. 
(c) Interdimensional additivity is satis$ed (for n > 3) if and only if(A3) holds. Thus, 
under (Al), (A2), and (A3), there existfunctions+i, definedonAj Y A,,i = l,..., n, andan 
increasing function F such that M(x, y) = F[xy=, +i(xi , yi)] where all the & are interval 
scales, with a common unit. 
(d) Subtractivity and additivity are satisfied (for n > 3) if and only if (A3), (A5), 
and (A6) hold. Thus, under the above assumptions, there exist functions fi , defined on Ai , 
i = l,..., n, increasing functions Ci , i = l,..., n, and an increasing function F such 
that M(x, y) = F[x:% &(I X;. - E’, I)], Xi = fi(xi) for all i, where the fi are 
interval scales and the q$ are interval scales with a common unit. 
(e) If n = 2, assertions (c) and (d) are still valid, provided (A3) is replaced by (A3’). 
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. 
To prove part (a) of Theorem 1, we define the function & by holding all components 
constant except the i-th and setting & = M. More precisely, let u be some fixed 
element of A. Let U,(xi) be the element of A whosej-th component equals uj for j f  i 
and whose i-th component is xi . Define 
From (Al) and (A2), & is a symmetric function, with &(xi , xi) < c$~(x? , yi) if xi f  yi . 
Let Ti be the range of the function & . We define a function F of n real variables, 
on T1 . ..’ .~ T, , by 
F@d.~, YA-, Mx,, , YJ = M(x, Y). 
We now use (A4) to prove that F is well-defined and increasing in each variable; this 
establishes decomposability. 
Suppose that Cz(xi, yJ = &(xi’, yi’), i = I,..., n. To show that F is well-defined, 
we must show that &2(x, y) = &2(x’, y’). For r = O,..., n, let x(r) be the element of A 
whose i-th component is xi for i > r and xi’ for i < r; define y(‘) similarly. Then for 




(1-I) = ,y 
u:;xj)j = r:,;x,')j ) 
cii(Yi), = ui(Yi’)j 2 
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(i-1) 
xi = U,(x,), , 
$i) 
& = ui(x,‘)i ) 
YP’ = Ui(Yi)i . 
yi”’ = ui(yi’)i . 
We may thus apply (A4), with xfi-l), yti-l’, ~(~1, yti’ playing the roles of X, y, x’, y’, and 
with Ui(x,), U,(yJ, UJx,‘), U,(y,‘) playing the roles of z, w, a’, w’, to obtain 
if and only if 
M[“i(xi)~ ui(Yi)l 3 M[Ui(xi’), ut(Yi’)l. 
But by definition of & , we have M[Ui(xi), U,(y,)] = M[Ui(xi’), Ui(yi’)]; hence, for 
i = I,..., n, we have M[x(i-l) y’i-1’1 = M[x(i) , ~(~‘1. Since X(O) = x, y(O) = y, 3~‘“) = x’, 
yen) = y’, we have M(x, y) L M(x’, y’) as required. 
The proof that F is strictly increasing in each variable is exactly parallel to the 
above, except that one of the equalities &(x~ , yi) = (bi(xi’, yi’) is replaced by strict 
inequality, and we obtain correspondingly a strict inequality between M[x’~~~‘, ~‘~-l’] 
and M[@, ~‘~‘1, hence, between M(x, y) and M(x’, y’), as required. 
To complete the proof of part (a), we must show that decomposability implies (A4) 
and that the Ci are ordinal scales. Suppose that there exist functions I,!Q on Ai x Ai 
andGon Range+, x **a x Range&, such that M(x,y) = G[h(x, ,yd,..., ~4h ,yJl. 
By definition, 
C<(xi 7 pi) = M[ui(xi), U~Y,)] = G[$l(ul 7 ul),..., #AXi 9 Yi),..., #n(~n > ~11, 
so $Q is an increasing function of & . Conversely, any increasing functions of the & 
can be used in a representation of form of Eq. 2, so the I#Q are ordinal scales. To show 
(A4), it suffices to note that under the hypotheses of (A4), M(x, y) >, M(x’, y’) if and 
only if &(xi , yi) 3 &(x6’, y,‘) (since the arguments of F are equal for j f  i). Similarly, 
M(z, w) > M(z’, w’) if and only if #Q(.z~, wi) 3 &(zi’, wi’). Since xi = zi, etc., the 
conclusion of (A4) follows. This completes part (a). 
To prove part (b), we proceed as follows. For each i, we must construct fi on A, 
such that &(xi , yi) = &[I fi(xi) - fi(yi)i], where & is the function constructed above 
for decomposability, and hi is an increasing function. Intradimensional subtractivity 
holds if and only if this is possible. This is essentially a one-dimensional problem, 
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i.e., the functions & , j f  i, have nothing whatever to do with the possibility of 
writing CJ$ in the needed form. Hence, we identify each x with Ui(xi), holding all 
coordinatesj f  i fixed at Uj , and we drop the i subscript for the remainder of the proof. 
The antecedent conditions of (A5) and (A6), asserting xj = yj = zj = Wj , or 
.xj = yj = x, zzz *y,’ = yj' = zj’, for all j f  i, will always be satisfied automatically, 
since all such coordinates are equal to uj . Thus, we apply the one-dimensional 
axioms (A5) and (A6) without reference to any subscripts. 
How can the psychological scale, f,  be constructed ? Suppose we set f  = 0 for some 
one element (for concreteness, f(u) = 0), and choose some element v  f  u to have 
f(v) = 1. Suppose that u 1 v  / w. Suppose also that we construct a sequence z(“), 
$1’ ) . . . ) ,&lJ’ ) . . . , .a(*) such that Z(O) = U, Z(Y) = U, and .z(@ = w, such that the $1 are 
equally spaced and ordered-that is, .$j-1) 1 .S) j ,&j+l) holds for j = l,..., 4 - 1 and 
&f[zlj), z(j+l)] is constant, independent of j. Intuitively, the u, z, interval is composed 
ofp equal intervals; therefore each has psychological length (I/p) if(v) -f(u)1 = 1 /p; 
and u, w is composed of q of the same intervals, thus it has psychological length q/p. 
Hence, we must define f(w) = q/p. Th is indicates the actual construction of the 
functionf. This construction is just like dividing a meter stick (e.g., U, v) into p = 1000 
equal parts, and then seeing how many millimeters (e.g., 4) are required to span u, w; 
The length of u, w in meters is then q/1000. Equality of millimetric divisions is 
replaced by equisimilarity, M[s+l’, .a@] = M[.G, ,&+l)] = ... ; ordering of the 
millimeters along a straight line corresponds to the requirement z(j-r) 1 z(j) 1 z(j+l), 
which is inferred from proximity data via the above definition of betweenness. It 
remains to be proved that this equisection process will really give consistent results 
(e.g., suppose the z(j) sequence is replaced by one with smaller or larger steps) and that 
the function f, so constructed, will predict the order of all proximity comparisons. 
The roles of (A5) and (A6) in such a proof are quite clear. Axiom (A5), if satisfied, 
guarantees that the “betweenness” inferred from proximity ordering is well-behaved; 
for example, if ,&-l) 1 .N / .S+l), and .G / a(j+r) j a(j+s), we know also that 
z(j-1) ~ z(i+l) 1 z(j+2). Axiom (A6) guarantees that two equal steps y, .Z and y’, UC’, in 
different parts of the scale, add on in the same way. For example, we can deduce, for 
the above sequence z(j), that M[G, JZ(~+~)] is also constant, independent of j, using 
(-46). 
We have taken pains to make clear the intuitive method of scale construction, and 
the reasons why properties (AS) and (A6) are needed to guarantee that it will work, 
because the formal proof does not proceed by showing in detail the consequences of 
the construction off just sketched. We could so proceed, but it would be very redun- 
dant to do so. The similarity of the above constructive scheme to measurement of 
physical length is more than a superficial analogy-the measurement-theoretic 
analysis of extensive measurement is directly applicable. What we do is reduce this 
case directly to one of the standard theorems on extensive measurement (Krantz, 1968), 
and use the real-valued function which that theorem tells us exists to construct f. 
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The counting-of-equal-units process is contained in the proof of the extensive mea- 
surement theorem and so does not appear explicitly here.3 
Let T denote the interior of the range of # ( remember, subscripts are dropped). 
By (Al) and (A2), T is an open interval of real numbers, with lower bound 4(x, x); 
it may or may not be bounded above. We define a binary operation, (s, t) ---f s * t, 
on a subset of T x T, as follows: 
If  s = 4(x, y), t = $(Y, 4, and ‘4Y I”“, 
then s * t = +(x, z). 
That * is well-defined follows readily from (A6). Denote by B the subset of T x T 
for which * is defined. 
LEMMA. The quadruple (T, B, *, 2) (where > is the natural ordering of real 
numbers) is an Archimedean positive ordered local semigroup in the sense of Krantx (1968); 
that is: 
1. 3 is a total order; 
2. if (s, t) E B, s 2 s’, t > t’, then (t’, s’) E B; 
3. ; f  (Y, s), (Y * s, t) E B, then (s, t), (r, s * t) E B and (Y * s) * t = Y  * (s in t); 
4. if r > s and (r, t) E B, then Y  ;I; t 3 s * t and t * r 3 t * s; 
5. if(s,t)EB,thens*t >s; 
6. ; f  t > r, then there exists s E T with (Y, s) E B and t > Y  c s; 
7. for any s, t in T, the set of integers m such that ms is dejined and t 3 ms isjnite 
[where 1s is defined as s, and if (m - 1)s is defined, and ((m - l)s, s) E B, then ms is 
defined as (m - 1)s es]. 
Proof. 
1. The first property is trivial. 
2. Assume s = 4(x, y), t = +(y, z), x 1 y  / z. Since s’ < s, by (A2) there exists y’ 
with x / y’ 1 y  and 4(x, y’) = s’. By (AS), y’ I Y I 2, so $(Y’, 4 3 t 3 t’. By W), 
there exists z’ with y’ j z’ / x and +(y’, z’) = t’. Since (A5) implies z’ 1 y’ I X, and 
c#(z’, y’) = t’, +(y’, x) = s’, we have (t’, s’) E B. 
3. Using (A2) and (A6) we can find x, y, x, and w such that r = 4(x, y), 
s=+(y,x), t =$(z,w), withxlylzand xIz(w. By (A5),ylzlw,so(s,t)EB, 
and s * t = +(y, w). By (A5), x / y  1 w, so (Y, s * t) E B and Y  c (s * t) = +(x, w) = 
(Y * s) * t. 
4. Follows immediately from (A6). 
a It can also be shown that the present assumptions allow us to construct a system satisfying 
the axioms of Suppes and Winet (19.53, who gave the first axiomatization of intradimensional 
subtractivity. The major advance in our treatment, besides simplicity of assumptions, is the 
elimination of their primitive (undefined) ordering along the dimension. 
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5. Let s = $(x, y), t = #(y, ) z w h ere x 1 y  1 Z. Since T is the interior of the 
range of $, t > $(y, y) = glb T; thus, y  f  Z. We can apply (A6) to the triples x, y, x 
and x, y, y  to deduce that 4(x, Z) > 4(x, y), or s * t > s. 
6. Follows immediately from (A2). 
7. Assume the contrary, i.e., that there exist s, t such that ms is defined for every 
positive integer m and t > ms for all m. Let t = 4(x, Z) and s = 4(x, x(i)), where 
.r / x(i) 1 Z. Since s c s is defined and <t, we know from (A6) that #(x(l), .a) > s; thus, 
we can find xt2) with .x(l) 1 xt2) / z and +(x(l) , xt2)) = s. This process can be continued 
indefinitely, obtaining x(O) = x, x(l), x(~),..., such that xX’(i) / ~c(~+i) / x(~+~) and 
x(i) / ,diA1) 1 z for i = 0, 1, 2 ,... . We have ms = 4(x, x(“‘)) < t for all m. The sequence 
$(x, X(m)) is increasing and bounded above, so it has a limit, Y, in T. Thus, for some y, 
x Iy 1 aand&x,y) = Y. 
Now choose y’ with x / y’ j y  and with +(y’, y) = s. By property 5, 4(x, y) = 
+(x, y’) * +(y’, y) > 4(x, y’). Therefore there exists some m such that 4(x, y) > 
4% x cm)) > 4(x, y’). Since 4(.x, x(“)) > 4(x, y’) and +(x(~), x(“l+l)) = s = +(y’, y), 
it follows from (A6) that 4(x, x(~+I)) > 4(x, y), a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
By Theorem 3.1 of Krantz (1968), th ere exists an increasing real-valued function g 
on T, unique up to multiplication by a positive constant, such thatg(s * t) = g(s) + g(t). 
Now definefas follows. Choose fixed u, v  with u f  U. Letf(u) = 0. If  x f  u, define 
I JMu7 4 
f(x) = \ -g(& x)) 
if 24 /x 1 v  or U/VlX 
if x 1 u 1 v. 
(If there is an upper bound of form $(u’, v’) for T, then choosing u distinct from u’,v’ is 
sufficient to guarantee that 4(u, x) E T for all x f  u.) 
It remains to be shown that +(x, y) is an increasing function of if(x) -f(y)l. 
Now x can be in one of three regions, defined by x / u / v, u / x 1 v, and u 1 v  I x, and 
so can y; this yields nine cases. The proof in each case is very simple; we carry through 
two cases for illustration. 
(i) Suppose u I v  1 x, u 1 v  / y. Now x / u / y  implies (with u / v  1 y, by A5) that 
x [ u / v; this with u / v  / x means that 4(x, u) = 4(x, v), contradicting the fact that 
g+(x, u) = g+(x, v) + g+(u, v), Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that 
u I x 1 y. We then have 
as required. 
F& Y) = &(% Y) - MU? 4 
= f(Y) -f(x) 
(ii) Suppose x 1 u / v, u 1 y  1 v. By (A5), we have x 1 u I y, hence, 
&(x7 Y) = g&x, 4 + Be4 Y) 
= -f(x) +m 
as required. 
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Similar treatment of other cases completes the proof that (A5), (A6) imply intra- 
dimensional subtractivity [in the presence of (Al) and (A2)] for each dimension. The 
converse follows immediately from properties of absolute values of differences of real 
numbers. 
Finally, to establish that f  is an interval scale, note that for any otherf’, h, with h 
increasing, such that $(x, y) = h[lf’(x) -f’(y)l], h-l is an additive representation of 
the structure (T, B, *, a), so by the uniqueness theorem for extensive measurement 
h-l = olg, where a > 0. Therefore 
If’64 -f’(Y)l = o(g4(~~ Y) 
= c3i If@) -f(Y)l. 
It follows in straightforward fashion thatfandf’ are related by a linear transformation, 
f’ = pf + y, where I/3 1 = 01, y  =f’(~). This completes part (b). 
To prove part (c) of Theorem 1, we note first that (A4) follows from (A3), so that 
Eq. 2 (decomposability) applies. It suffices to show that appropriate monotonic 
transforms of the &(xi , yi) can be chosen so that the function of n variables, F, can 
be written as a function of the sum of component-wise contributions. This is a standard 
problem in additive conjoint measurement (see Lute, 1966). We will not review here 
the construction of the appropriate transformed &‘s; it is similar to the constructions 
of extensive measurement (see Krantz, 1968, and Lute and Tukey, 1964, for details). 
The simplest proof is obtained by reducing the theorem to that of Debreu (1960). 
Debreu’s theorem gives sufficient conditions for a function F on a product set 
T = Tl x --. x T,, to be written as F(t) = G(xy=, Ai(t The conditions (for n 3 3) 
are: 
1. Each Ti is a connected and separable topological space. 
2. If  rj = tj , j f  i, and F(Y) < 01 <F(t), then there exists s, with s, = r, = tj 
for j f  i, and F(s) = 0~. 
3. If  sj = sj’ and tj = tj’ for all j # i, and si = ti , si’ = ti’, then F(s) < F(t) if 
and only if F(s’) ,< F(t’). 
4. For any s, the sets {t 1 F(s) 2 F(t)} and {t 1 F(t) 2 F(s)} are closed in the product 
topology on T. 
To apply this theorem, let Ti be the range of & (for part (b), we had let Ti be the 
interior of the range). Each Ti is an interval of real numbers so Condition 1 is satisfied 
(indeed, Debreu uses Condition 1 only to replace his topological spaces by isomorphic 
real intervals). Condition 2 follows readily from (Al) and (A2), while Condition 3 is 
essentially the same as (A3). Only Condition 4 offers a bit of difficulty; it is established 
as follows. 
To show that (t / F(t) 3 F(s)) is closed, let t be an arbitrary element not in this set, 
i.e., F(t) < F(s). We must show that there is a neighborhood N of t, in T, such that 
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F(P) < F(s) for all t’ E N. We define elements ti* E Tj inductively as follows. Suppose 
that ti* has been defined for i < k, where 1 < K < 71, and thatF(t,* ,..., t;-i, t, ,..., t,) 
(which we denote akc-i for short) satisfies the inequalityF(t) ,( 01~~~ < F(s). Define tk* 
as follows. If  t, = lub Tk , let f,* = t, . (Note that in this case, 01~ = (~,+i and we are 
done with this step.) Otherwise, choose rli E Tk , with rk > t, . SinceF(t,*,..., tzpl , rk , 
tt+1 >.‘., t,J > 01~~~ > F(t), we can choose a number (Ye satisfying 
F(t) ,( akP1 < 01~ < min{F(s), F(t,* ,..., tc-;*-l , rL , tk+l ,..., t,J} 
and can then choose t,* with t, < t,* < rk such that F(tl*,..., tk*, t,,, ,..., t,) = aii 
as required. Denoting (tl*,..., tn*) by t*, we have, by construction, F(t) < F(t*) <F(s), 
and for each i, either ti* = lub Ti or ti < ti *. I f  ti* = lub T, , let Ni = Ti ; other- 
wise, let Ni = {ti’ j ti’ < t,*). In either case, Ni is open in Ti , so N = Nl x ... i< N, 
is open in T. Clearly, F(t’) < F(t*) f  or all t’ E N, so N is the required neighborhood. 
The other half of Condition 4 is proved in the same way, with inequalities reversed. 
Applying Debreu’s theorem now shows that (A3) implies interdimensional additivity. 
The converse is straightforward. The uniqueness follows from standard uniqueness 
results for n-dimensional conjoint measurement (e.g., Debreu, 1960; Lute, 1966). 
For part (d) of Theorem 1, it suffices to note that under the assumptions (A3), (A5), 
(A6), (b) and (c) both apply, yielding 
M&Y) = Wf&4 -fdrJl T..., If&n> -fn(~n>l> 
By the ordinal uniqueness theorem for decomposability, we have &(xi , yi) = 
r$i(l fi(xi) --fi(yi)l), where & is an increasing function, i = I,..., 71. Substituting q$ for 
& yields the additive difference model (Eq. 5). 
The functions & in Eq. 5 can be normalized so that 4,(O) = 0; this makes them ratio 
scales. 
Finally, we note that Debreu’s theorem applied only for n > 3; for 71 = 2, he 
proved the same result, assuming the Thomson condition from the theory of webs in 
place of Condition 3. But this latter condition follows from (A3’) just as his Condition 3 
follows from (A3). This establishes part (e) of the theorem. For n = 1, only part (b) 
(which was proved without any restriction on n) is of interest-decomposability and 
additivity are trivial. 
II. ADDITIVE DIFFERENCE METRICS 
The additive difference model (Eq. 5), established in Theorem 1, provides a measure- 
ment of dissimilarity that generalizes the power metric (Eq. I). Nevertheless, it need 
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not be a metric distance function. A metric distance function or a metric, for short, is a 
function from A x A into the reals, which assigns to every pair of points X, y  a number 
d(x, y), called their distance, such that the following conditions are satisfied. 
(Ml) POSITIVITY. d(x,x) = 0 andd(x,y) > 0 $.x fy,  
(M2) SYMMETRY. d(x,y) = d(y,x). 
(M3) THE TRIANGLE INEQUALITY. d(x,y) + d(y,z) > d(x,z). 
The metric axioms, by themselves, impose very little structure. They are satisfied, 
for example, by the trivial form d(x, X) = 0 and d(x, y) = 1 for x f  y. In any of the 
more interesting geometries, (e.g., Euclidean, Riemannian) it is further assumed that 
any pair of points is joined by a segment along which distances are additive. Stated 
formally, we introduce 
(M4) SEGMENTAL ADDITIVITY. For any distinct points x and z, there exists a set 
of points Y, and a one-to-one mapping, f, f ram Y onto some real interval [u, b], such 
that x, z are in Y, f(x) = a, f(z) = b, and for any u, v  in Y, d(u, v) = j f (u) -f (v)i. 
Hence, in particular, (M4) implies that for all y  in Y, d(x, y) + d(y, z) = d(x, z). 
An ordinal axiomatization of a metric with additive segments (i.e., a scale satisfying 
(Ml), (MZ), (M3), and (M4)) has been developed by Beals and Krantz(l967).Note that 
the above axioms are applicable to any arbitrary set of points. I f  our object set, however, 
has a product structure (like the object sets discussed in the previous section) it may be 
of interest to investigate a weaker version of (M4) where segmental additivity is 
postulated for points that differ only on one dimension. Stated formally, we obtain 
(M4’) SEGMENTAL ADDITIVITY. (M4) h Id f o s or any points x, x that d@er on one 
dimension only. 
We refer to a metric scale as a metric with additive segments or as a proper metric 
depending on whether it satisfies (M4) or (M4’), respectively. An additive difference 
model (Eq. 5) is said to be compatible with a metric, if there exists a metric, d, satisfying 
Mb-4 4 d M(y, 4 if and only if d(w 4 < d(y, 4, 
for all w, X, y, z in A. This section is devoted to the investigation of the constraints 
imposed on the additive difference model by the assumption that it is compatible with 
a metric satisfying (M4) or (M4’). 
From the assumption that an additive difference model is compatible with a proper 
metric, it follows that there exists some increasing function F such that for all X, y  in ,4 
(6) 
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If X, z differ on the i-th dimension only, then any y  on the additive segment Y joining 
them must also differ from them on the i-th dimension only (otherwise, it is easy to 
show that the triangle inequality would be violated). For such ay, we have (normalizing 
so&(O) = 0): 
F[4%0 xi - yi I>1 + F[+i(l yi - zi I>1 = F[+i(l xi - zi I>]. 
Since 1 Xi - Zi 1 3 ) Xi - Yi /, / Yi - Zi 1 (i.e., x / y  ) z), we have 1 Xi - Zi / = 
1 Xi - Y, / + 1 Yi - Zi /. Putting CL = / Xi - Yi /, /? = 1 Y( - Z, / yields 
F[+i(a)l + F[di(P)l = F[+i(a + P)l* 
By defining &(a) = F[&(a)] we obtain the equation &(cL) + &(/3) = &(LY + p), for 
all IY, p in a nonnegative real interval including 0. The only monotonic solution is 
IJ~(~) = tp. Since F is one-to-one, it has an inverse, F-l, satisfying 
F-l[&(cu)] = F-l(t,a) = $&(a) for i = l,..., n. 
But since F-l is independent of i, all the &‘s must be identical up to a change of unit 
of their domain. Hence, under (M4’), there exists some function 4 such that, for any i, 
bib> = &4 
Next, we study the consequences of the triangle inequality. Consider three points X, 
y, z in A such that x and y  differ only on the ith dimension, while y  and z differ only on 
the&th dimension. From (6) and (M3), we obtain 
Letting ) LX-i - Yi / = 01, and j Yj - Zj 1 = /3, yields 
F[h(a>l + F[+j(P)l 3 FL&(a) + dAB)l* 
But since F[&(a)] = fIcy, i = l,..., n, and &(LY) = F-l(+) = d(tia) we can apply 
F-l = 4 to both sides of the above inequality to obtain +(F[+i(a)] + F[q!~~(/3)]) = 
$(tp + t$) > 4(+> + C(t$) and $ is, th ere f  ore, a superadditive function. (Note that 
convexity implies superadditivity, provided 4(O) = 0, but not conversely.) The above 
discussion has, thus, demonstrated the first part of the following: 
THEOREM 2. For an additive d#erence model to be compatible with a proper metric, 
it is necessary that the functions & , i = I ,..., n, satisfy 
(9 h(a) = #dtia) 
(ii> C(a + PI 2 544 + 4(P). 
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It is su&ient that $ is of the form 
lj(cx) = p(e*a - 1)‘, for p>O, q>O, ral. (7) 
Thus, according to Theorem 2, any proper metric that is compatible with an additive 
difference model must be of the form 
4% Y> = 4-l i 4@i I xi - yi I) 1 for some superadditive C#J. (8) i=l 
It is readily seen that the power metric provides one example of a proper metric where 
+(a) = c?, for some Y >, 1. Another example of a proper metric, called the exponential 
metric, is obtained by letting $(a) = eqa - 1, for some q > 0. An extension of both the 
power metric and the exponential metric is given in (7). The exponential metric is 
clearly a special case of (7) where p = Y = 1. The power metric is obtained from (7) 
by letting p + co and q - 0, keeping constant the quantity k = pqT. Here, $(a) 
converges uniformly to ka’. 
To prove the second part of Theorem 2, we have to show that the form defined by 
Eqs. 8 and 7, is a proper metric. It is immediately verifiable that (Ml), (M2), and (M4’) 
are satisfied, hence we have only to show that (M3) is also satisfied. Letting 
01~ = ti ( Xi - Yi 1, and pi = tj / Yi - Zi 1, i = l,..., n, the triangle inequality (M3) 
reduces to 
6-l [i: 5+i)] +4-l [i am] z 4-l [i 44% + Pi)] . 
i=l i=l i=l 
(9) 
Since $(a) = p(eqE - l)‘, with p > 0, q > 0, Y > 1, by hypothesis, +-‘(a) = 
(l/q) log[l + (cx/P)“~]. Substituting 4-l in the left-hand side of (9) yields 
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(since we have dropped from the last expression inside the parentheses all terms of the 
form $(cxJ $(fl,) for any i # j, all of which are nonnegative) 
= flog 1 + c 24, [ (,I, T) ll’+ (p:) l’?+ (Cl wi) l’j 
(by substituting A, = @a~ - 1 = [(l/p) &(yi)]il’, and Bi = e*si - 1 = [(l/p) #$)]ilr 
throughout) 
(since, by the Minkowksi inequality, for any r >, 1, 
f  (A,B, + Ai + BJl “’ I 1 (again, by the Minkowski inequality) i=l 
(by substitution) 
= 4-l [i+ $(% + Al] 
i=l 
as required, which completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Thus, we have seen that (7) and (8) d o indeed define proper metrics, but we do not 
know whether these metrics exhaust the class of additive difference models that are 
compatible with a proper metric. That is, we do not know whether there exist some 
other solutions, 4, to Inequality 9. 
A close inspection of the last part of the proof of Theorem 2 reveals that the 
triangle inequality is satisfied with equality only if +(ai) r&Ij) = 0 for any 
i # j. But since 4 is increasing and 4(O) = 0, the above product vanishes only if 
j Xi - Yj 1 . 1 Yj - Zj 1 = 0 for all i f  j. Hence, unless X, y, and z differ only on 
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one dimension, y must coincide with x and/or x. We have, thus, demonstrated 
the following: 
COROLLARY. The metric defined by (7) and (8) satisfies the triangle equality, 
i.e., d(x, y) + d(y, 2) = @, ~1, f  or some triple x, y, z ;f  and only if they dayer on one 
dimension only. 
Although the power metric can be viewed as a limiting case of the metric defined 
by (7)and (8), it differs from nonlimiting cases of this family in that it satisfies segmental 
additivity. In other words, the above corollary does not hold in the limit: for every x 
and Z, the triangle equality holds for every y on the affine straight line joining x and Z. 
To see this, note that y is on the affine segment joining x and z if there exists t, 
0 < t < 1, such that Yi = (1 - t) Xi + tZi , i = 1 ,..., n. We have 









1’T+ (1 - t) i I xi - .& IT 
L I 
1/F. = t 1 xi - zi 17 
i=l i=l 
= d(x, z). 
Moreover, the power metric is characterized by this fact: it is the only additive 
difference metric which is also a metric with additive segments. This is a new result, not 
announced in Beals et al. (1968).In that paper, an additional axiom(A7) was introduced, 
to the effect that the affine midpoint of any two points lies on the additive segment 
between them, and the above result was stated, assuming that (A7) held. However, 
it turns out to be unnecessary to assume (A7). The precise theorem is as follows: 
THEOREM 3. Suppose that M satisfies (Al) to (A6) and that d is a metric compatible 
with M, satisfying (Ml) to (M4). Then there exist an unique real number r > 1 and 
real valued functions Xi = fi(xi) on Ai , such that 
d(x, y) = i 1 Xi - Yi lr l’+.. 
i=l I 
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The proof of Theorem 3 is based on a geometric lemma that appears not to have 
been known previously. The proof of the lemma was the work of Dr. M. Perles. 
LEMMA. Let S be an open convex subset of n-dimensional Euclidean space. Let d be 
a metric on S, satisfying intradimensional subtvactivity with respect to linear coordinates 
in S. If d satisjes segmental additivity (M4), then d is homogeneous, i.e., for any x, z in S 
and t with 0 < t < I, d[x, x + t(z - x)] = td(x, z). (Another way of expressing 
homogeneity is that Euclidean lines are additive segments.) 
We remark that, as a corollary, for S equal to all of Euclidean n-space, the only 
metrics with additive segments satisfying intradimensional subtractivity are the general 
Minkowski metrics (see Busemann, 1955, pp. 94-104). 
The homogeneity of the metric in Theorem 3 follows from the above lemma, 
without use of interdimensional additivity. Using homogeneity and interdimen- 
sional additivity, we then obtain the power metric from a theorem of Hardy, 
Littlewood, and Polya (1952) on homogeneous means. 
Note that in the above lemma, and in the following proof, the terms “open,” 
“closed,” and “continuous” refer exclusively to the natural topology of Euclidean 
n-space, not to the relative topology induced by S nor to the metric topology induced 
by d. 
Proof c$ the Lemma. First consider the case where t = 1 /m, where m is an integer 
> 1. Suppose X, z are in S. Fork = 0, I,..., m, define zcL) = x + K(z - x)/m. By 
convexity of S, each z(~) is in S. By intradimensional subtractivity, d[zck:-l’, zlb)] = 
d[x, x + (z - x)/m] for K = I,..., m. From the triangle inequality, we have 
d(x, z) < f  d[z’“-I’ , ~(~‘1 = md[x, x + (z - x)/m]. 
k=l 
Thus, d[x, x + (z - x)/m] > d(x, z)/m. W e need to obtain the opposite inequality 
to establish the lemma for t = l/m. 
By segmental additivity, we can choose y(O), y(l),..., ycrn) in S equally spaced on the 
segment from x to z, i.e., d[y(“-l’, y(Q] = d(x, z)/m, i = I ,..., m, where y(O) = X, 
Y cm’ = z. Let x(i’ = y’i’ - y'i-I', i = I ,..., m. Since S is open, there is a number 
6 > 0 such that x: + u is in S for every u such that 1 uj ) < S,j = l,..., n. I f  we choose 
m large enough d(x, z)/ m is arbitrarily small; since d is monotone in each coordinate, 
we can obtain 1 x!~’ ( = j y’!’ - y’!-I’ , 3 3 j < s,j = l,..., n. Thus, d[x, x + ~(~‘1 is defined 
and = d[yci-l), ~(~‘1 = d(x, z)/m for i = l,..., m. Now x + (z - x)/m is a convex 
combination of the vectors x + ~‘~1, namely: 
Fl [x + P]/m = x + f  [yci) - yCi-l’]/m 
i=l 
= x + (z - x)/m. 
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Hence, the inequalities d[x, x + ~(~‘1 < d(x, z)/m will imply the inequality 
4x, x + (z - 4/m] < d( X, z m )/ p rovided that spheres are convex-if m points are 
within a given distance of X, then any convex combination of them is within that same 
distance of x. 
Note that once this convexity result is established, so that d[x + (z - x)/m] = 
d(x, x)/m for sufficiently large integers m, the lemma follows. For by segmental 
additivity, the same equation holds for t = k/m, wherever 0 < k < m and m is 
sufficiently large; and by monotonicity, it follows for 0 < t < 1. So we turn to the 
matter of convexity of spheres. To establish this, we use the Krein-Milman theorem 
(1940), which asserts that a closed convex set in Euclidean n-space is the closed convex 
hull of the set of its extreme points. (Extreme points are not proper convex combi- 
nations of any other points.) 
Let x be fixed and let B(ol) denote the sphere with center x and radius 01, i.e., 
{y j d(x, y) < a}. Let C(a) be the convex hull of B(a), i.e., the smallest convex set 
containing B(a), which is the set of all convex combinations of elements of B(a). 
By continuity of d, for 01 sufficiently small, B( 01 is a closed set entirely contained in S. ) 
The convex hull of a closed set is closed, so C(a) is a closed convex set. By the 
Krein-Milman theorem, the set of extreme points of C(a), denoted E(a), is the minimal 
set whose convex hull is dense in C(ar). In particular, B(U) contains E(a). Thus, to 
prove that B(a) is convex (equal to C(a)), it suffices to show that any convex combi- 
nation of elements of E( cy. is in B(or). It even suffices to show this for convex combi- ) 
nations of form & yti)/r, where yfi) . is in E(a), since such combinations are dense in 
C(a) (any convex combination with rational coefficients can be written in such a form, 
by letting Y be a common denominator). 
We showed above, using segmental additivity and intradimensional subtractivity, 
that y in B(or) implies that y/r is in C(ol/r) (th ere, we used a vector of formy = z - x, 
but this is irrelevant). But if y is in E(a), then y/r must be in E(ol/r). For suppose the 
contrary, i.e., y/m = cEl hiwti), where Xi > 0, XI=, hi = 1, and wci) is in C(OI/Y). 
Since C(OI/Y) is the set of convex combinations of B(c+), we can suppose without loss 
of generality that w fi) is in B(~/Y). By the triangle inequality, rwti’ is in B(a); hence 
y = x:-r &YW(~) is not in E(a), a contradiction. Hence, a convex combination 
Cl=, y(i)/~, with yci) in E(a), has each yu)/v in B(a/r). By translation invariance and the 
triangle inequality, CL, yu)/r is in B(a) as required. Thus we have shown that B(a) is 
convex (for 01 small enough so that B( 01 is a closed set in S). Since we apply the result ) 
only for OL = d(x, z)/m, for sufficiently large m, we can assume that m is large enough 
to obtain B(a) convex. This establishes the lemma completely. 
Proof of Theorem 3. 
If the conditions of the theorem hold, then d is given by 
i +(I -G - Yi I) , 
i=l 1 
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where the constants ti of Theorem 2 are here absorbed into the definition of Xi =fi(zcJ. 
Since the metric d is defined on a (convex) cube, the Cartesian product of the ranges of 
/ xi - Yi 1) i = l,..., 71, the lemma applies. If  we let LY{ = j Zi - Xi 1, the equation 
d[x, x + t(z - z)] = td(z, z) implies the following functional equation. 
We shall show that the only solutions to the functional Eq. 10 are of form $(a) = RCZ. 
To do this, two steps are required. First, we make some remarks about the domains 
of 01~ , t for which Eq. 10 has been shown to hold, and show that 4 can be extended to 
map [0, co) onto itself, with (10) valid for 0 < 01~ ,..., 01,) t < co. Second, we show 
that Eq. 10 implies that 4 satisfies another functional Eq. 12, for which the only 
solutions are d(a) = Rol’. 
By Theorem 2, the additive difference model, d(x, y) = F[Cy=, &(I Xi - Yj I)], 
yields a proper metric only if each +Ja) = $(tp), where 4 = F-l. Thus, 4-l is defined 
for all numbers XL1 &(I Xi - Yi I), and each & coincides with 4 (except for the 
factor ti multiplying the argument) in its own domain. Moreover, since the domains 
of & are intervals, we can choose w > 0 such that for each i, 1 < i ,( 71, and each OL, 
0 < 01 < u/ti , (Y is in the domain of & . Note that in particular, if wi = u/ti , 
$-l[,& &(wi)] = #-‘[n+(w)] is defined. We denote this quantity by Q; note that 
4 = F-l is defined at least on the interval [O, Q]. Note finally that for n = 1, the 
theorem is immediate, with Y = 1 (d(x, y) = F[c#(~ X - Y I)], but d is additive, so 
F$ = multiplication by a constant) (all power metrics are identical for n = l), while 
for 71 > 1, Q > w. We can now extend 4 as follows. 
For a: < w, we have by (10) 
= (+I cb-‘h+J)l 
= LY.Q/u. 
Thus 4 satisfies 
cb-l(u) = (Q/w) $w4=), 0 < a < n&J). (1 lb) 
We can use (1 la) to define 4 for CL such that the right side of (1 la) is defined, i.e., for 
0 < 01 < Q2/w. Note that Q2/w > .R, so this really does extend 4 beyond the interval 
4w7/3-I4 
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[0, Q]. Correspondingly, 4-r satisfies (11 b) for the extended interval 0 < a < n+(Q) = 
a”+(w). Moreover (10) is now valid for 0 < oli < Q and 0 < t < 1: 
(by 114 
(by lib) 
(by 10, applied for pi = c+J/!J < w) 
(by lib) 
(by lla). 
Repeatedly applying the arguments extends the intervals in which #J is defined and in 
which (10) is valid by a factor Q/W each time. Thus, we can extend 4 to [0, co), and 
have (10) valid for 0 < ai < co, 0 < t < 1. Under these circumstances, it follows 
immediately that (10) is valid for 0 < t < co. The function $, so extended, coincides 
with the original $ at least on [0, Q]. 
Now by (lib), we have, for 0 < 01~ < 00, 
It follows immediately that the homogeneity equation, (IO), applies to the mean-value 
function, +-‘[( 1 /n) ,%#~(a~)] : 
k’ [k i d(tail] = +l [i 8(%)] . 
2=1 i=l 
(12) 
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By a result in AczCl(l966, p. 153) an increasing function v, with ~(0) = 0, satisfying 
(12) for 0 < 01~ < co, 0 < t < GO, must be of form Roar. 
Going back to the original function 4, we see that ~$(a) = Izc/, at least for 0 < 01 << 8. 
But now, for any j &Yi - ki I, i = I ,..., 71, we can find t > 0 so small that 
tti 1 xi - k’l / -< w, i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, using (10) (since we can assume t < I), we 
have 
1 n lli- 
zz- t ,Ic f (tti / xi - E7i I)’ I (since tti / -Yj - Ii / < W) i=l 
Thus, d is a power metric, for all points x, y  (and of course, by the uniqueness part of 
Theorem 1, #,(a) = k(tp)’ in the large). 
The restriction 1 < r < cc is occasioned, not by Eqs. 10 or 12, but by the need to 
satisfy the triangle inequality; we refer the reader to standard discussions of the 
Minkowski inequality (e.g., Hardy et al., 1952, or any book on functional analysis). 
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS AND R/IETRICS 
It has been shown in the previous sections that (Al)-(A6) yield additive difference 
measurement of dissimilarity between multidimensional objects. According to this 
model, dissimilarity judgments are described in terms of two sets of scales that apply 
to each one of the dimensions. The first set of scales, fr ,...,f,* , applies directly to the 
physical input and describes its psychological counterpart along each one of the 
dimensions. We shall call them psychophysical functions. The second set of scales, 
d i ,..., & , applies to the perceived component-wise differences along the dimensions, 
and describes their contributions to the overall dissimilarity between the stimuli. 
We shall call them similarity functions. In the additive difference model, dissimilarity 
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judgments are decomposed into two independent processes: a “perceptual” process 
satisfying intradimensional subtractivity, and an “evaluative” process satisfying inter- 
dimensional additivity. Another version of the additive difference model, that is based 
on preferences rather than similarity judgments, was presented in Tversky (1969). 
Although the general concept of a similarity function has not been formally intro- 
duced, related notions have been proposed in the analysis of similarity judgments. 
In discussing the results of a two-dimensional similarity experiment, Attneave (1950) 
writes: 
a given change in the difference between two stimuli becomes less noticeable as the 
total difference between the stimuli is increased. It is tempting, therefore, to think 
of it as a sort of second order Weber-Fechner function. The abscissa is already related 
to the physical variable, if there are magnitudes, by a Fechner function or some suitable 
variant thereof; the present interpretation suggests that these first order psychological 
distances on the abscissa are pseudo-physical in their relationship to some higher 
perceptive level and they go through another Fechner transformation in being perceived 
[p. 5521. 
In the additive difference model, the stimuli are represented in a dimensionally- 
organized space, but the dissimilarity ordering need not coincide with any metric. 
The assumption that an additive difference model is compatible with a proper metric 
imposes severe restrictions on the shape and the interrelations among the similarity 
functions, restrictions that may but need not be acceptable on empirical grounds. More 
specifically, if an additive difference model is compatible with a proper metric, all 
similarity functions must be essentially identical; moreover, they should all be 
superadditive. 
In multidimensional scaling it is assumed that stimuli can be characterized by some 
(subjective) dimensions, and that the dissimilarity between them is compatible with 
a metric. It should be emphasized, however, that the dimensional and the metric 
assumptions are independent of each other, as each one of them can be satisfied 
without the other. The failure to distinguish between the metric and the dimensional 
assumptions hinders the explication of their empirical meaning and the clarification of 
their psychological justification. What, then, is the psychological meaning of metrics 
and dimensions ? 
The concept of a metric with additive segments has been analyzed in detail by Beals 
and Krantz (1967) (see also Beals et al., 1968), so we limit our discussion to the concept 
of a psychological dimension-a concept that has been used in the literature in several 
different senses. 
One meaning of the term dimension is a variable that can be manipulated experi- 
mentally, such as the intensity of a tone, or the shape of a geometric figure. This use 
of the term dimension is neutral from a psychological standpoint since it refers to the 
way in which stimuli are specified or generated physically and not to the way in which 
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they are perceived. Several physical dimensions (in the above sense) may combine into 
a single psychological dimension and vice versa. 
A second meaning of the term dimension is a trait, or a variable, that cannot be 
observed or measured directly, but can be expressed in terms of other measurable 
traits or variables. The factor analytic definitions of pure neuroticism or of abstract 
reasoning ability are examples of dimensions that are defined as (linear) combinations 
of some measurable variables, such as various test scores. Hence, such definitions can 
be viewed as derived measurement. The scaling of these dimensions (though not their 
labeling) does not depend on any testable psychological assumptions, rather it attempts 
to express a large number of correlated variables in terms of a smaller number of 
uncorrelated ones. 
The third, and by far the most interesting, meaning of the term dimension refers 
to the factors along which stimuli are perceived and structured. In speaking of hue, 
saturation, and brightness as dimensions of color space, or of potency as a dimension 
of semantic space, it is typically implied that these dimensions serve as organizing 
principles in the perception of colors or words. To accept such an interpretation, 
however, one has to demonstrate the role played by the alleged dimensions in the 
perception of objects. This can be done in two different ways. 
One approach consists of collecting introspective data, of a direct or an indirect 
nature, about the manner in which objects are perceived. The second approach consists 
of constructing dimensional models and then testing whether any variable (specified 
physically or defined in terms of other variables) acts like a dimension as defined 
in the model. In this approach, therefore, a psychological dimension is defined in terms 
of its formal characteristics. Consequently, one can test which of several variables, if 
any, can be regarded as a dimension by studying its formal properties. 
One necessary condition for defining a psychological dimension is the possibility 
of defining equivalence classes with respect to this dimension in a way that is inde- 
pendent of the levels of the other dimensions. Thus, if area, for example, is one of the 
psychological dimensions of geometric figures, then one would expect judgments 
concerning area to be independent of the shape of the figures. This may not be true 
when area is defined physically, but still be true when area is defined by a psychological 
rather than a physical operation. Indeed, this is the major difficulty in specifying 
psychological dimensions in physical units. 
The possibility of defining equivalence classes in an independent fashion, however, 
does not exhaust the properties expected of a psychological dimension. Additional 
properties can be discovered by examining the models proposed for similarity data. 
The analysis of a large class of multidimensional similarity models shows,that the 
dimensions of the space satisfy two major assumptions: (intradimensional) subtractivity 
and (interdimensional) additivity. These properties may, thus, be taken as defining 
properties for psychological dimensions. The axiomatic analysis of these properties 
reveals what are the testable ordinal assumptions that are necessary and/or sufficient 
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for subtractivity and additivity to be satisfied. Hence, it provides methods for testing 
whether a given factor is a psychological dimension in the sense of satisfying sub- 
tractivity, and satisfying additivity with respect to some other dimensions. 
The present approach is characterized by treating multidimensional scaling models 
as quantitative psychological theories rather than as methods for data reduction. It 
rests on the supposition that the axiomatic analysis of these models combined with the 
experimental investigation of their consequences will result in a deeper understanding 
of the metric and dimensional structures that underly similarity data. 
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